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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WALTER P. HENOCH,

Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

7578
W. H. BINTZ COMPANY, A Corporation,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, respondent herein, accepts the statement
of facts contained in the brief of appellant.
The parties hereto will be designated herein as they
were in the lower court. The respondent herein will be referred to as the plaintiff, and the appellant will be referred
to as the defendant.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT
VOLUNTARY GIFT OF $100.00 BY THE DEFENDANT
TO T'HE PLAINT'IFF CHRISTMAS OF 1947, WHICH
WAS PRIOR TO THE DATE DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED UNDER CONTRA:CT T'O PAY PLAINTIFF A
BONUS, WAS GIVEN TO PLAINTIFF WITHOUT AREQUEST BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR AN ADVANOE!MENT
OF HIS BONUS, AND SO CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED
A PAYMENT ON T'HE CONTRACT, BUT ONLY A GIFT.

POINT II.
THE PROMISE TO PUT PLAINTIFF ON THE INCENTIVE BONUS PLAN, "THE SAME AS THE OTHER
SALESMEN," BEGINNING AS OF MARCH 1,1948, WAS
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN, WHERE THE BONUS WAS
NOT PAYABLE UNTIL MARCH 1, 1949, AND THE
OTHER SALESMEN, AS WELL AS THE PLAINTIFF,
WERE INFORMED, PRIOR TO THAT DATE, THAT
THEY WOULD ALL BE ON THE SAME INCENTIVE
BONUS PLAN BEGINNING MARCH 1, 1948, AND THEY
WERE ACTUALLY PLACED ON SUCH A BONUS PLAN,
AND BEFORE THAT DATE PLAINTIFF WAS INFORMED THAT HE WAS ON A BONUS. BASIS OF 1
PER CENT' ON TOTAL SALES IF HE SOLD A QUOTA
OF $100,000.00, WHICH HE DID SELL.
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POINT III.
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A BONUS OF 1
PER CENT ON THE TOTAL SALES OF $197,553.00,
OF WHICH HE RECEIVED ONLY $1,000.00.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT HELD SORENSEN OUT AS HAVING AUTHORITY TO HIRE AND FIX PAY AND BY
THEIR FAILURE TO TIMELY INFORM PLAINTIFF
THAT SORENSEN DID NOT HAVE SUCH AUTHORITY, DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO THEREAFTER
DENY SORENSEN'S AUTHORITY.
POINT V.
T'HE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY
PLAINTIFF A BONUS ON THE STAR VALLEY
CHEESE TRANSACTIONS INVOL,VED IN POINT V
FOR THE REASON THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO
INFORM PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF HIS HIRING
OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER
THAT SUCH SALES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM
BONUS COMPUTATIONS FOR PLAINTIFF OR FOR
THE OTHER DAIRY SALESMEN.
POINT VI.
EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT PLAINTIFF
GAVB UP A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION FOR THE
DEFENDANT'S PROMISE OF A 1 PER CENT BONUS
AND WAS DISCHARGED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT
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CAUSE, BEFORE THE END OF THE 1949-1950 FISCAL
YEAR, AND SINCE PLAINTIFF GAVE A VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION FOR SAID PROMISE, PLAINTIFF
IS ENTITLED TO HIS BONUS ON ALL SALES FOR
THE SAID PERIOD TO THE DATE OF HIS DISCHARGE, AS DEFENDANT, BY DISCHARGING
PLAINTIFF, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PLAINTIFF
TO COMPLETE THE YEAR, OR COMPLETE HIS
QUOTA.
POINT VII.
THERE WAS NO EVIDE'NCE OF A TENDER OR
SETTLE-MENT' IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY
THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF AND
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DEFINITE AND
CERTAIN TENDER IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
IS A QUEST'ION OF FACT FOR THE JURY, AND
WHEN THE JURY DETERMINED FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NOT AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE APPELLATE COURT ARE BOUND THER.EBY.
POINT VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
DE'FENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR NON SUIT, FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING, AND FOR NEW TRIAL, AS ALL OF THE
POINTS. ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIED WER.E
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON EACH POINT TO SUPPORT
TH'E JURY'S VERDICT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT
VOLUNTARY GIFT OF $100.00 BY THE DEFENDANT
TO THE PLAINTIFF CHRISTMAS OF 1947, WHICH
WAS PRIOR TO THE DATE DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED UNDER CONTRACT TO PAY PLAINTIFF A
BONUS, WAS GIVEN TO PLAINTIFF WITHOUT A
REQUEST BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR AN ADVANCEMENT OF HIS BONUS, AND SO CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED A PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT, BUT
ONLY A GIFT.
There is only one question involved in defendant's first
point: Was the Christmas present of $100.00 given to plaintiff December 25, 1947, by the defendant, a gratuity, or
was it a part of the contract to pay plaintiff the promised
$500.00 incentive bonus at the end of the fiscal year March
1, 1948? The jury must have decided that the Christmas
present was a pure gratuity and not a partial satisfaction
of the contract to pay $500.00.
By the contract of hiring, the defendant was obligated
to pay the plaintiff $500.00 on or about the 1st of March,
1948, the end of the 1947-1948 fiscal year. Any sum which
the defendant voluntarily gave to the plaintiff prior to the
end of the said fiscal year, without a request from the
plaintiff, (and there was no evidence of a request for an
advancement by the plaintiff) would be purely a gift, not
chargeable against the contractual obligation to pay $500.00.
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That this was the intent of the parties is shown from the acts
of the defendant. When DeVine was questioned as to why
$400.00 was paid instead of $500.00, he did not say that
plaintiff had received $500.00-$100.00 at Christmas and
$400.00 then. He merely attempted to deny Sorensen's
authority to promise $500.00 (R. 98). Again the following
year, according to DeVine's statement, $1,000.00 was promised (which plaintiff claims should have been 1% of all
sales). $100.00 was paid at Christmas time and $1,000.00 at
the end of the fiscal year. They did not pay $100.00 at
Christmas and $900.00 at the end of the fiscal year. The
defendant thus, by its own acts, placed its own interpretation upon the Christmas gratuity and showed that it was
not intended to apply against the contractual bonus obligation (R. 101, L. 13-15).

POINT II.
THE PROMISE TO PUT PLAINTIFF ON THE INCENTIVE BONUS PLAN, "THE SAME AS THE OTHER
SALESMEN," BEGINNING AS OF MARCH 1, 1948,
WAS DEFINITE AND CERTAIN, WHERE THE BONUS
WAS NOT PAYABLE UNTIL MARCH 1, 1949, AND THE
OTHER SALESMEN, AS WELL AS THE PLAINTIFF,
WERE INFORMED, PRIOR TO THAT DATE, THAT
THEY WOULD ALL BE ON THE SAME INCENTIVE
BONUS PLAN BEGINNING MARCH 1, 1948, AND
THEY WERE ACTUALLY PLACED ON SUCH A BONUS
PLAN, AND BEFORE THAT DATE PLAINTIFF WAS
INFORMED THAT HE WAS ON A BONUS BASIS OF
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1 PER CENT ON TOTAL SALES IF HE SOLD A QUOTA
OF $100,000.00, WHICH HE DID SELL.
The contention of defendant in Point II, that the
"methods or factors upon which incentive pay was to be
computed" were too uncertain and indefinite upon which
to base a contract to pay plaintiff a bonus during the fiscal
year of 1948-1949, is certainly unfounded from the evidence. There was an incentive plan with a definite bonus
based on a sales quota, under which the plaintiff then became entitled to a bonus of a specific sum.
At the time of the original hiring, plaintiff was promised by defendant's agent, Sorensen, that he would receive
the· incentive plan "the same as the other fellows in the
dairy department" (R. 24, 48, 63). Sorensen, on crossexamination, was asked the question, "I think you testified,
didn't you, that Mr. Henoch would be treated like the rest
of the salesmen in the discussion with regard to bonuses?"
To which he answered, "That's right, Mr. Richards" (R.
86, L. 14-17). Sorensen also testified that the incentive
plan, as applicable to other salesmen, was explained to
Henoch (R. 79, L. 4-5). Sorensen was asked, "But you said
he would be treated like the rest of the salesmen," to which
he answered, "If he earned it, yes." He was then asked,
"And when you told him if he earned that, you meant if he
sold his quota?" and he answered, "Yes, but the quota was
part of the incentive plan. I couldn't tell him what the
quota would be" (R. 79, L. 9-15).
When the bonus basis and quota were established for
the other salesmen, and, as plaintiff contends, likewise estab-
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lished for plaintiff, it thereupon became binding upon the
defendant and could not be arbitrarily withdrawn or
amended by the defendant. 56 C. J. S. 529, n. 95.
The defendant makes a point of the fact that the other
fellows who were selling in the dairy department were at
that time, on different incentive pay programs. These
divergent incentive programs only carried them up to the
end of the fiscal year of 1947-1948, at which time another
incentive program was being discussed by the defendant
which was to, and which did, go into effect as of March 1st
1948. To cover the 1947-1948 period, when there was divergence between the bonus plans as set up for the other employees, plaintiff was promised a flat $500.00 bonus. From
and after March 1st, 1948, all of the salesmen in the dairy
department, of the defendant company, were on the same
incentive plan (R. 107, L. 27-30; R. 108, L. 1-5). The plaintiff was informed by Sorensen in the fall of 1948 that he
was on the incentive plan the same as the other salesmen
and that if he sold $100,000.00, he would receive 1 upon
total sales in his territory, whether or not he himself, or the
defendant company, made the sale (R. 63 and 64).

ro

Note the conflict in the testimony of Sorensen and DeVine, defendant's witnesses, with regard to the date the
incentive bonus plan was born. De Vine said the plan was
not born until January of 1949 and that Kilgore and Cole
were notified January 7, 1949, that the new plan would
take effect and be retroactive to March 1, 1948 (R. 108, L.
14-17); but Sorensen said that he had learned of the plan in
the "fall of 1948" from discussions with DeVine (R. 73, L.
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6-9). It is only reasonable to suppose that if Sorensen
learned of the plan in the fall of 1948, that Sorensen did
promise plaintiff the same bonus that the other fellows in
the dairy department were receiving during the same time.
It was reasonable, too, for plaintiff to write to DeVine in
the fall of 1948, after Sorensen had explained the new
bonus plan, and ask for an official confirmation of Sorensen's promise. This refers to the letter which the defendant
presents as an argument to show indefiniteness and uncertainty of the terms of the contract. The plaintiff knew
by all the promises obtained from the defendant that his
bonus would be the same as the other dairy salesmen would
receive and he wanted official confirmation of the fact as
it had been then determined. Plaintiff was also in the dark
about the application of sales made by others in his territory
which had been promised to him.
The jury had to choose between the direct testimony of
the plaintiff and the conflicting testimony of the defendant's witnesses. The defendant, by its witnesses, tried to
show that there was no quota and no promise of a 1%
bonus based upon that quota, but again the acts of the company and the attitudes of the parties support the testimony
of the plaintiff and controvert the verbal, conflicting testimony of the witnesses for the defendant. The plaintiff
testified that his sales quota was $100,000.00 (R. 30, L.
30-31; R. 31, L. 1; R. 34, L. 7-19, 26-30; R. 42, L. 17-24;
R. 44, L. 12-13, 20-29 ; R. 53, L. 13-14 ; R. 63, L. 22-30 ; R.
64, L. 1; R. 66, L. 1-11).
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Now note the acts and indirect, off-guard statements of
the witnesses for the defendant, which bring out the truth in
support of plaintiff's direct testimony as follows:
(a) Other salesmen were getting a bonus of 1% based
upon a $100,000.00 quota (Sorensen, R. 82; DeVine, R. 107,
L. 27-30; R. 108, L. 1-5).
(b) Plaintiff was to be treated like other salesmen
(R. 86, L. 14-17; R. 79, L. 9-11).
(c) Plaintiff was better trained than the other salesmen and was left in charge in Sorensen's absence (R. 81).
(d) An incentive plan was explained to plaintiff (R.
79, L. 4-5) and the quota was an integral part of that incentive plan (R. 79, L. 14~17; R. 85, L. 10 and 11).
(e) Sales quotas were established for plaintiff and
other salesmen (R. 72 and 74).
(f) Plaintiff's territory was enlarged at his request
in order that he might more readily attain his quota (R.
48, L. 27-30).
(g) The defendant voluntarily agreed to pay the
plaintiff $1,000.00 to keep him encouraged (R. 99, L. 12)
and half-way satisfied (R. 103, L. 17-22) at a time when
DeVine did not think plaintiff would attain his quota (R.
34, L. 7-17).
(h) The promise was confirmed by payment of the
$1000.00.
(i) The reaction of DeVine when informed plaintiff
expected to attain his quota confirmed instead of refuting
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the quota, and the bonus based thereon, when DeVine said,
"Well, it will only go over a few dollars anyway. It is only
a matter of $40 or $50" (R. 34, L. 7-19).
Each of these points supports plaintiff's testimony.
Considered together, they constitute irrefutable proof that
the quota was established on which the promised bonus
was based for plaintiff, as well as for the other salesmen.
"Absolute certainty in every deal is not required
as basis for an action at law. When only legal relief
is sought, only 'reasonable certainty' is demanded of
contract, requirement being fulfilled if meaning of
contract, as whole, is intelligible to court." Kann v.
Wausau Abrasiyes Co., 153 A. 823, 85 N. H. 41;
Cowles v. Cole, 244 N. Y. S. 4, 137 Misc. 491; 17 C.
J. S. 366, Note 79 (2).

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A BONUS OF 1
PER CENT ON THE TOTAL SALES OF $197,553.00,
OF WHICH HE RECEIVED ONLY $1,000.00.
The contention of defendant, that plaintiff received
more than was due him, is not sound. The plaintiff contends that defendant sold in plaintiff's territory, during
the fiscal year commencing March 1, 1948, to February 28,
1949, dairy equipment in the sum of $197,553.00, based
upon which the bonus should have been $1,975.53, of which
plaintiff received only $1,000.00.
Defendant admitted that the sales made by defendant
during the year ending February 28, 1949, in plaintiff's
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territory was $105,860.00. Bonus on this amount would be
$1,058.60. Defendant contends $100.00 was paid at Christmas 1948 and $1,000.00 in March 1949, thus overpaying
the bonus by $41.40. The argument set forth under Point 1
with reference to the Christmas gratuity in 1947, applies
with equal force to the Christmas gratuity paid at Christmas in 1948.
Plaintiff contends that in addition to the $105,860.00,
two additional items (the amounts of which and the profits
made thereon by defendant were undisputed), one for $49,270.80 and the other for $42,422.00, were actually sales by
the defendant in plaintiff's territory and which, added to
the $105,860.00, made up the total of $197,553.00. Defendant contends that these two latter items were not sales by
the defendant. The plaintiff concedes that these two items
were not sales of dairy equipment from the floor of the
defendant company, but were sales by the defendant company as brokers or agents for the manufacturer. It is undisputed that the defendant company did receive from these
two sales, profits of $2,463.54 and $2,121.00, respectively,
during the fiscal year ending February 28, 1949 (R. 88, L.
18-20). From the conflicting testimony, the jury believed
these two transactions to constitute sales by the defendant
upon which bonus was due to the plaintiff.
Let us summarize the evidence on which the jury based
their findings. The plaintiff testified (R. 31) that Sorensen made a trip to Star Valley and was instrumental in
selling the boilers. They were handled by or through Pace
Turpin Company. This sale was in plaintiff's territory
(R. 31, L. 22-23). The dryer was also sold through the in-
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strumentality of Mr. Sorensen (R. 32, L. 8-12; R. 55, L.
22-26). Plaintiff's cross-examination shows that the sales
were made by W. H. Bintz Company (R. 56, L. 1-3; R. 57,
L. 2-6). Plaintiff, who was an engineer, took measurements
for installation of the boilers and assisted in the installation
(R. 54, L. 10-24). Both commissions were received during
the summer of 1948 (R. 77 and 78 and R. 88).
The jury rightfully disregarded the nomenclature of
the defendants when they stated these transactions were not
"sales" and concluded that they were actually sales by the
defendant, on which defendant received a brokerage or commission, of which plaintiff was entitled to his bonus percentage.
Furthermore, if such sales were not to be included in
the basis of the compensation of defendant's dairy department salesmen, the defendant was under a duty to inform
plaintiff before the obligation arose and not after the
transaction had been fully consummated and after plaintiff
had rendered service in connection with the transactions and
after he had been promised that ALL sales made in his
territory would be taken into account in computing the
bonus. This profit, commission, or brokerage, or whatever
defendant chose to call it, was received by defendant in the
summer of 1948 (R. 88, L. 17) but it was not until November of that same year that plaintiff was informed that it
was not the intention of the defendant to pay commission on
items of this nature (R. 100, L. 15-28; R. 34). The defendant denied (R. 74 and R. 94) that these transactions were
sales, but since defendant received $2,463.54 on the boilers
and $2,121.00 on the dryer, the jury was justified in de-
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termining that these two items were sales by defendant, and
plaintiff was therefore entitled to 1% on such sales.

POINT IV.
DEFENDANT HELD SORENSEN OUT AS HAVING AUTHORITY TO HIRE AND FIX PAY AND BY
THEIR FAILURE TO TIMELY INFORM PLAINTIFF
THAT SORENSEN DID NOT HAVE SUCH AUTHORITY, DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO THEREAFTER
DENY SORENSEN'S AUTHORITY.
The defendant, by this point, seeks to deny liability by
attempting to deny Sorensen's authority to employ and fix
incentive pay.
At the time of the employment, the defendant held
Sorensen out as having authority, both to hire and fix pay.
That he had authority to hire is affirmed by DeVine's testimony (R. 107). If Sorensen had the power to hire, as testified to by DeVine, he certainly had the apparent authority
to fix rates of compensation, and DeVine, by his acts, confirmed and acknowledged Sorensen's authority to hire and
to fix rates of pay, as shown by his acts at the time of the
hiring.
At the time of the original employment, plaintiff had
an offer of another job which would have paid him more
money. He therefore insisted that Sorensen tell him definitely what his compensation would be with the defendant
( R. 23) . At that time the defendant held Sorensen out as
having authority to hire and to fix pay; and Sorensen did
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fix the monthly salary, the expense account, and the incentive
bonus, (Henoch, R. 23; Sorensen, R. 69, L. 24-27). When
the act of hiring was completed, Sorensen then took plaintiff upstairs to meet Mr. DeVine. Regarding this conversation, DeVine testified (R. 96 and 97), "Mr. Sorensen
brought him in and introduced him to me and said he was
employing him and (it) was just more or less of a welcome
to the organization." At this conversation nothing was said
by DeVine or Sorensen respecting compensation. On the
other hand, the company confirmed Sorensen's hiring and
establishment of compensation by paying regularly the
agreed salary and expenses. Not until eight months after
the hiring, in March of 1948, was Sorensen's authority first
called into question. If Sorensen actually had no authority,
then Mr. DeVine had a duty at the time plaintiff was hired
to inform plaintiff what his compensation would be. He
could not wait for eight months and then, for the first time,
deny Sorensen's authority.
Nothing more was said about Sorensen's authority until
November of 1948, which was sixteen months after the time
of hiring, but again DeVine's actions conflict with his spoken
word because his actions in offering the $1,000.00 bonus,
even though he thought plaintiff was not going to attain
the $100,000.00 quota, indicates that he knew all about the
incentive program which Sorensen had promised and that
he was ratifying Sorensen's authority and promise (R. 34).
The direct testimony of the plaintiff, together with the
omission of the defendant and the subsequent acts of the defendant, justified the jury in finding that Sorensen had not
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only apparent but actual authority to hire and to fix compensation.

POINT V.
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY
PLAINTIFF A BONUS ON THE STAR VALLEY
CHEESE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVED IN POINT V
FOR THE REASON THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO
INFORM PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF HIS HIRING
OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER
THAT SUCH SALES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM
BONUS COMPUTATIONS FOR PLAINTIFF OR FOR
THE OTHER DAIRY SALESMEN.
With reference to Point V, we need merely to state
that the plaintiff, at the time he was hired, was informed
that he would receive a bonus, based upon all sales in his
territory, by the defendant company, and there was no
reservation of any deals wherein the defendant company
sold, as agent or broker, for the manufacturer. Plaintiff
was not informed that items of this nature were not to be
included until sixteen months after he was hired, and after
the company had received $4,584.54 profit from the two
transactions in question. This matter is fully argued under
Point III above.
The defendant is estopped by its failure to inform the
plaintiff, at the time of hiring, of the reservation of any
sales on which the plaintiff, or the other salesman, would
not be entitled to bonus.
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POINT VI.
EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT PLAINTIFF
GAVE UP A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION FOR THE
DEFENDANT'S PROl\1ISE OF A 1 PER CENT BONUS
AND WAS DISCHARGED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT
CAUSE, BEFORE THE END OF THE 1949-1950 FISCAL
YEAR, AND SINCE PLAINTIFF GAVE A VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION FOR SAID PROMISE, PLAINTIFF
IS ENTITLED TO HIS BONUS ON ALL SALES FOR
THE SAID PERIOD TO THE DATE OF HIS DISCHARGE, AS DEFENDANT, BY DISCHARGING
PLAINTIFF, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PLAINTIFF
TO COMPLETE THE YEAR, OR COMPLETE HIS
QUOTA.
The question here raised is the right of the plaintiff to
receive his 1% on sales by the defendant in plaintiff's territory during the 1949 fiscal year and up to the date of
plaintiff's discharge.
The plaintiff was discharged by the defendant on December 15,1949 (Answer to Interrogatory 10 (b) R. 6).
On page 101 of the Record, line 19, appear the words, "Not
up to the time that he severed his employment with us."
It is the sincere contention of the plaintiff and of the plaintiff's counsel that the witness DeVine stated this answer,
"Not up to the time that we severed his employment with
us," which statement would be in accordance with the actual
fact ; and motion to correct the record in this regard is
being concurrently filed, with the filing of this brief.
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There is nothing in the record to show that the defendant was discharged for cause, either in the pleadings
or in the proof. If defendant elected to rely upon this as
an affirmative defense it should have been pleaded and
proved at the trial.
The obligation to pay a bonus is contractual, and in this
case was based upon a valid and valuable consideration, towit: the giving up of a better-paying job (R. 24, L. 7-8).

"Bonus at end of year. A promise to pay an
employee a bonus at the end of the year is a mere
gratuity and not enforceable where the employee is
not shown to have done or foregone something which
otherwise he was not obliged to do or forego; but if
the employee is induced thereby to do something
which he is not under legal obligation to do, or to
forego something which he does not have to forego,
the promise is enforceable." 56 C. J. S. 529.
As authority, C. J. S. quotes Redd v. Williams Radiator
· Co., 296 P. 676, 678, 112 Cal. App. 353 and cases cited in

39 C. J. 159, Note 96.
The following cases support the rule of law that where
an employee has given up a good and valuable consideration
for a promise of a bonus at the end of the year, he is entitled to a proportionate share of the bonus where he is discharged without cause, prior to the end of the year, and the
burden of proof rests upon the defendant employer, if it
sets up the discharge as a defense, to prove that the discharge was for valid cause:
Willoughby Camera Stores vs. Commr. Int. Rev.,
C. C. A. 2, 125 F. 2nd 607
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Roberts, et ux v. Mills, Inc., 114 S. E. 530, 28
A. L. R. 338
Payne v. United States, 269 Fed. 871, 50 App.
D. C. 219
Youngberg v. Lamberton, 91 Minn. 100, 97 N.
w. 571
Mile v. California Growers, etc., 114 P. (2d) 651
In accordance with the provisions of the law as. above
quoted, and in the absence of any showing of discharge
for cause, the jury was justified in awarding plaintiff a
bonus, for the proportionate part of the year, based upon
the $62,453.18 sales which he had made up to the time of
his discharge in his territory (R. 24, L. 7-8).

POINT VII.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A TENDER OR
SETTLEMENT IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY
THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF AND
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DEFINITE AND
CERTAIN TENDER IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY, AND
WHEN THE JURY DETERMINED FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NOT AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE APPELATE COURT ARE BOUND THEREBY.
This point considers whether or not there has been an
accord and satisfaction at the end of each pay period.
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Whether or not the plaintiff accepted these checks
from the defendant in full satisfaction of the plaintiff's
claim, and whether or not an accord and satisfaction existed,
is a question for the jury, and if there is any evidence upon
which to base their verdict the trial court, as well as the
appellant court, is bound thereby. This is the law as set
forth in the only case which defendant has cited in its brief,
as authority for its. position, to-wit: Ashton vs. Skeen, 85
Utah 489, at 489-499,39 Pac. 2nd, last PP pg 1077, where the
court said:
"In the present case the court has found and the
finding was amply justified by the evidence and this
court is bound by that finding, that Ford Brothers
refused to accept it in full settlement of their claim,
and notified Skeen that they wanted more money."
The case of Shell v. McCrum, 179 Iowa 1232, 162 N.
W. 759, held that accord and satisfaction and settlement involved an aspect of the essentials of a contract, and of the
law of estoppel. The Court said :
"In other words there is no settlement and no
accord and satisfaction unless both parties act knowingly, with intent to execute the accord * * *
It suffices where stated, that upon the record and on
authority it was at least a question for the jury
whether the claimed accord, satisfaction and settlement were executed. Since that was a jury question,
the court did not err in refusing to hold that the
accord was established as a matter of law."
The jury had the evidence of the checks and the evidence of the acts of the parties. All the checks, the Christmas gratuities, the monthly salary and expense checks, and
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the bonus checks, all bore the same statement, "Your endorsement of the attached check is an acknowledgment of
its correctness. This is an exact copy of our payroll record.
W. H. Bintz Company. Payroll Receipt."
If these words were intended as an offer in accord and
satisfaction, such offer, at best, was ambiguous and could
be interpreted by the recipient and by the jury as a partial
payment on account, especially in view of the defendant's
evidence that there was no "payroll record" of a promised
incentive bonus (R. 101, L. 9-10). If there was no payroll
record of a bonus, any statement on the check with reference thereto could have no probative value. Then the only
thing left on the check is the acknowledgment of its "correctness." Correct may mean anything. It could be "correct" as a payment on account. It did not purport to be
payment in full, or settlement in full, as is required for an
accord and satisfaction.

On the question of ambiguity of the terms employed in
the offer of an accord and satisfaction, the court, in the
case of Crucible Steel Co. of America v. Premier Mfg. Co.,
94 Conn. 652, 110 Atl. 52, said:
"When the assent of the creditor is sought to be
inferred from the acceptance of a lesser sum than
that claimed to be due, the fact that such amount is
offered in full discharge of the whole claim must
have been communicated to the creditor in some
unmistakable manner.''
The law is well stated to be:
"To constitute such a payment an accord and
satisfaction, it must be offered as FULL SATIS-
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FACTION of a claim and acknowledgment by sueh
declaration or under such circumstances as would
amount to a condition that if accepted by the creditor
it would be in full satisfaction of the debt." Harrison
v. Henderson, 67 Kans. 194, 62 L. R. A. 760, 100 Am.
St. Rep. 386, 72 P. 875; 34 A. L. R. 1052. 1 C. J.p.
558. Notes 62, and p. 559. Notes 69 and 70."
As each monthly check was given to the plaintiff, certainly such checks were not considered by either plaintiff
or defendant to constitute a settlement of the promised
bonus, which promise the defendant acknowledged by its
acts, as hereinabove argued. When the $400.00 check was
given, there was absolutely no statement, prior thereto,
that it was intended as an accord and satisfaction, nor was
plaintiff informed by defendant that defendant considered
the check payment in full. When plaintiff received the
$400.00 check, he went to Sorensen, who had promised him
$500.00, and complained about the amount of the check
and Sorensen said, "They probably deducted the $100.00
Christmas present from it" ( R. 26). Sorensen did not say
the balance would not be paid or that the $400.00 was all
he would get. Plaintiff, after receiving said check, went
to DeVine, the defendant's manager, and complained about
having received only $400.00 instead of $500.00, and DeVine
did not say that the $400.00 was all he would get, but said,
"Well, we have been trying to find out for two weeks what
Bob had promised you" (R. 41, L. 10-20). And when plaintiff demanded the balance, DeVine did not answer one
way or another. He certainly did not inform the plaintiff
that he would not get the balance of $100.00 owing plain-
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tiff, and DeVine, on direct examination, did not assert
that it was payment in full (R. 98, L. 1-18).
At the time the $1,000.00 was paid, the last words prior
thereto were to the effect that DeVine did not expect the
bonus check would amount to more than $40.00 or $50.00
in excess of the $1,000.00 (R. 34, L. 16-17). When plaintiff received this $1,000.00 check, he protested that it was
insufficient, and still expected to receive more (R. 35, L.
19-23).
The jury must have believed (a) that since the monthly
checks all contained the same statement, but the defendant
nevertheless paid Christmas gratuity and bonus, the defendant itself did not rely upon the statement on the checks
as constituting a tender of an accord and satisfaction; or
(b) that the wording on the checks is so vague and uncertain and ambiguous that it did not constitute an accord and
satisfaction; or (c) that the plaintiff was not at any time
informed that the payments tendered to him were intended
to be tendered as an accord and satisfaction, the checks not
to be used unless the payee was willing to accept them as
payment in full. In any event the jury must have found that
no accord and satisfaction existed, and the trial court and
appellate court are both bound by such finding.
POINT VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR NON SUIT, FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING, AND FOR NEW TRIAL, AS ALL OF THE
POINTS ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIED WERE
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QUESTIONS OF FACT AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON EACH POINT TO SUPPORT
THE JURY'S VERDICT.
It is apparent that Point VIII raises only the question

of whether there was sufficient evidence upon which the
jury could find, on all of the issues, for the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has heretofore, in this brief, set forth a resume
of the evidence as to each of the items (a) to (e) contained
in defendant's Point VIII justifying the jury in finding
for the plaintiff. It is not deemed necessary nor proper
to repeat the argument here. Therefrom, it is clear that
the jury had sufficient evidence before it to determine all
of these questions of fact raised by the defendant in Point
VIII and decided all of them in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, and the court did not err in denying
the defendant's motion for non-suit, for directed verdict,
for judgment notwithstanding, and for new trial.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, plaintiff submits that the verdict of the
jury is supported by sufficient evidence in every particular
and that the judgment of the trial court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN Y. RICHARDS,
PERRIS S. JENSEN,
406 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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